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ABSTRACT 
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continue to be developed through the Middle East because of the ethnic, religious, 
cultural, and historical ties each republic holds with the region.  Despite the perceived 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will still seek 
foreign aid from the Middle East while attempting to mitigate the influence of foreign 
powers in their internal affairs.  Because of growing US interests in Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea area, the US will seek to be become engaged and to expand its influence in 
the region through its Middle East ally, Turkey.  Growing US and Turkish influence will 
come at the expense of the former regional hegemon, Russia, and the historic Middle East 
power, Iran.  This complex interaction between old and new powers has the potential of 
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With their independence in 1991 from the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian 
states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the 
Caucasian state of Azerbaijan each faced serious challenges in their struggle to build new 
nations.  With ethnic, cultural, historic, linguistic, and religious ties with the Middle East, 
the governments of these states looked towards the Middle East in their development. 
However, as the regimes encountered the problems of nation building, the ethnic 
diversity of the region, with many groups having ties with the Middle East, and the rapid 
growth of Islamic fundamentalism further destabilized what little security each of the 
governments held.  The governments responded by adapting harsh measures and 
mitigating the influence of Middle Eastern powers into each of their states.  This 
suppression of democracy was ignored by the West as it also feared the growth of a 
fundamentalist state in Central Asia. 
Encouraged by the West, the new states sought a secular, Middle East state to use 
as a model for development.  In Turkey, they found a secular model of government and a 
bridge to the Western world and the United States.  Turkish and US influence continues 
to grow within the region at the expense of the historic Middle East power, Iran, and the 
former regional hegemon, Russia. 
This growing friction between the regional powers and the US, however, has not 
been limited to the economic field.  In the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-
Karabakh, each of the regional powers were drawn into the war because of geopolitical 
interests and security concerns.  The United States, allied with Turkey, aligned itself 
against Russia and Iran.  As the dispute was internationalized, the local conflict had the 
potential to become a regional war that arrayed a US ally and NATO member against a 
nuclear-armed, former superpower.  Nagorno-Karabkh set a dangerous precedent on how 
future conflicts would be handled by the regional powers and the United States. 
 xiii
Because of their shared ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious ties, the Central 
Asian states and Azerbaijan will continue to rely on the Middle East for their 
development.  However, because of geopolitical interests and security concerns, this 
complex, evolving relationship could lead to future conflict.  Any country that has an 




A. DESCRIPTION  
This thesis will argue that the Central Asian states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the Caucasian state of Azerbaijan will 
continue to be developed through the Middle East because of the ethnic, religious, 
cultural, and historical ties each republic holds with the region.  Despite the perceived 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will still seek 
foreign aid from the Middle East while attempting to mitigate the influence of foreign 
powers in their internal affairs.  Because of growing US interests in Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea area, the US will seek to be become engaged and to expand its influence in 
the region through its Middle East ally, Turkey.  Growing US and Turkish influence will 
come at the expense of the former regional hegemon, Russia, and the historic Middle East 
power, Iran.  This complex interaction between old and new powers has the potential of 
leading to conflict.  An understanding of this complex relationship is important to any 
country that has an interest in the region. 
In 1991, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics of 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the Caucasian 
state of Azerbaijan were faced for the first time with the prospect of existence as 
independent states.  In many respects, they were unprepared for this event.  Serious 
political, economic, ethnic, and religious challenges confronted the new states as each 
faced the prospect of building strong political, economic, and social institutions that were 
capable of supporting an independent country. 
After independence, only Soviet-era political structures remained behind, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union fragmented the armed forces that still remained in each of 
the republics’ territories.  Ethnic and religious diversity, controlled under the Soviet rule, 
were now brought to the fore.  The economies of the republics, used during the Soviet era 
to supply raw materials, now faced the problem of integrating into the global system as 
independent entities. 
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Even after ten years, stability within Central Asia and Caucasia remains in flux.  
The governments in place, while allowing for some political participation, have made 
slow progress in moving away from the Soviet model of a strong, one party central 
government.  Few governments have achieved the legitimacy needed to consolidate and 
to stabilize their regimes.  Because of this, the states are highly susceptible to outside 
influences, as each regime tries to stabilize its political base in order to remain in power. 
During the Soviet period when Moscow closed the Central Asian and 
Transcaucasian states from foreign powers, Middle Eastern influence was minimal.  With 
independence, old ties with the Middle East were renewed, bringing the republics new 
pressures.  With many of the states having significant Muslim populations and many 
having ethnic, cultural, historical, and linguistic ties to the Middle East, the governments 
looked to the Middle East to help them emerge from the Cold War.  However, each also 
sought to balance their need for foreign aid with their new freedom away from the 
influence of any foreign powers.  Of the Middle Eastern states, Turkey and Iran play the 
most important roles, as each has old ties with many of the new states and each shares 
significant borders with Caucasia and Central Asia. 
Influence in the region for Turkey and Iran, however, is not uncontested.  As 
sovereign states with differing national goals, Turkey and Iran sometimes have 
conflicting interests in the development of the region.  With the economic potential of the 
Caspian region, the United States has also increased its presence in the area through its 
NATO ally, Turkey.  However, because of the continuing tension between the United 
States and Iran left over from the Iranian Revolution, what role Iran will play in US 
foreign policy remains to be seen.  Russia, the former hegemon of the region, still regards 
Central Asia and Caucasia to be within its sphere of influence and is very wary of any 
outside influence that detract from its power there. 
This complex interaction has led and will lead to conflict.  Although the chance of 
military confrontation by outside powers within the region seems remote, the possibility 
does exist.  With increased foreign interests within the region, the governments of each 
state see the potential of harnessing outside powers for their own interests.  Concurrently, 
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foreign powers are also willing to use the instruments of international diplomacy and 
power to further their own interests within the region.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis will come from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources.  It will use the history of Central Asia and Caucasia, and the history of Middle 
Eastern and Russian interaction in the region as a guide for future developments.  The 
thesis will make use of books, scholarly articles, web sites, newspaper articles, and 
government transcripts as research sources about the evolving ethnic, religious, and 
political climate in the region. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II examines how ethnic diversity and Islamic fundamentalism became 
sources of instability for the regimes of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan after 
independence.  The chapter will show how the ethnic layout of Central Asia and Caucasia 
did not correspond to the any of the national borders of the new states, placing added 
pressure on the governments as they struggled to create national identities.  The chapter 
will also show how the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, fueled by Middle Eastern 
foreign powers, contributed to the insecurities of the regimes, causing them to react by 
becoming more authoritarian in order to retain power and to attract foreign aid while 
mitigating the influence of undesirable foreign elements in the affairs of the individual 
states. 
Chapter III will examine the roles the Middle East states of Turkey and Iran have 
in the development of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.  The chapter will show how these 
states are influenced by ties to the Turkey and Iran, and how the governments look to 
Turkey as a model of secular development while remaining wary of Iran’s fundamentalist 
ideology.  The chapter will also examine growing US influence in the region through 
Turkey and “pipeline politics,” and how this affects the United States’ relationships with 
Russia, the former regional power during the Cold War, and Iran, a historic power in 
Central Asia and Caucasia. 
Chapter IV is a case study of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  The chapter will show how Nagorno-Karabakh is a possible 
precursor of future conflict within the region as the belligerent states have used foreign 
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powers and evolving blocs and alliances to their advantage.  An in-depth study, specific 
to Nagorno-Karabakh, of the internal problems and national ambitions the belligerent 
states hold, and the security concerns and national interests of Turkey, Iran, and Russia 
will show how these regional powers and the United States were drawn into the conflict. 
Chapter V integrates the various factors that have played a role in the 
development of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan after 1991.  It offers informed 
conclusions about how the ties Central Asia and the Middle East share together have 
influenced the nation-building process of the new states.  It concludes that because of 
their shared ethnic, cultural, historical, linguistic and religious ties, these states will 
continue to rely on the Middle East for their development.  However, this complex, 
evolving relationship could lead to future conflict as the regional powers, along with the 
United States, advance their geopolitical interests and address their security concerns. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Central Asia and Caucasia (From Microsoft Encarta Reference Suite 2000) 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES:  
ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For the new Central Asian republics undergoing the process of nation building, 
ethnic diversity and Islamic fundamentalism immediately became sources of instability 
for each of the regimes following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Because no nation-
states existed in the centuries before the Russian conquests and because the post-Soviet 
states are defined by the arbitrary borders created by Stalin during the Soviet era, the 
lines of demarcation between the states fail to correspond to the ethnic situation in the 
region.  With independence, an Islamic revival began in the region as religion, long 
suppressed under communist rule, was allowed to flourish.  However, with the 
politicization of Islam in the opposition parties in each of the new republics, the regimes 
increasingly saw the growth of Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to their power and to 
the stability of the new nation-states.  This reality immediately became a cause of 
concern for the regimes as they sought to legitimize their power in the new republics.  
With the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and with many ethnic groups having 
ties to the Middle East, the Central Asian governments continued to seek aid from the  
Middle East while mitigating the influence of Middle Eastern powers in the internal 
affairs of their states.  To gain favor with the West that also feared the growth of 
fundamentalism, the Central Asian governments adapted harsh measures against the 
Islamic opposition.  With little experience in independent government away from the 
sphere of the Soviet Union, and with ineffective police and security apparatuses, the 
regimes increasingly became authoritarian to consolidate their power and retain what 
legitimacy they possessed. 
B. ETHNIC REALITY 
The regimes had to confront the problem that major concentrations of ethnic 
minorities resided within countries other than their titular nations.  One million Uzbeks 
live in the Khojent province of Tajikstan, half a million in the Osh area of the Fergana 
Valley in Kyrgyzstan, and 280,000 in the Chimkent region of Kazakstan.  One to two 
million Tajiks live in Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbekistan, and nearly a million Kazaks 
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reside there.  There are roughly eight million Russians, Ukrainian, and Germans living in 
the northern part of Kazakstan.  Kurdish communities with links to the Middle East are 
scattered throughout Central Asia, and Turkmenistan has a large ethnic Iranian 
population.  In each of the republics, “The percentage of the titular nationality (and the 
ruling elite)…may be less than half [with] ethnic populations split by international 
boundaries.”1 
The situation did not allow for the growth of any form of ethnic nationalism.  This 
reality, along with the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism, retarded the process of 
nation building for the new republics.  Unlike many former colonies of foreign powers, 
Central Asia did not experience any national liberation struggles that welded the goals of 
the elite and the masses together.  No sense of loyalty to the nation was ever created.  
While Russia experienced the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the people of Central 
Asia were barely touched by the political events that would shape their future.2 
Central Asian republics did not go through any of the natural pangs of state 
building and thus their identity is at best confused.  Under communism, the 
people were largely alienated from the political structure and decision-making.  
After independence this alienation only increased as many regimes bunkered 
down to survive and paid little heed to democratizing society, devolving power to 
the regions, or involving the people in the political process.3 
Under the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian states had the political assets of 
territoriality and sovereign structure constructed around a core nationality that 
represented a majority of the population.  Within the system, “the concept of republic 
[was] rooted in the recognition of ethnicity as the basis of nationality.”4  However, after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, “the assumption that ethnicity would automatically 
translate into national identity with the eponymous republics being transformed into 
states [was] challenged.”5 
                                                 
1Diane L. Smith.  Central Asia: a new Great Game?  http://www.milnet.com/milnet/pentagon/centasia.  
17 June 1996. 
2 Ahmed Rashid.  The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (1994) Oxford University 
Press: 240 
3 Ibid 
4 Eden Naby. “The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions.” Central Asia and the 
Caucasus after the Soviet Union (1994): University of Florida: 39 
5 Ibid, p.51 
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The breakup of the Soviet empire has spawned minorities within minorities.  Any 
nationalist revival will have to ensure a program watered down enough so that it 
includes distant cousins from different tribes; otherwise the nationalists will be 
unable to gain support from all strata of society…The region has already 
witnessed many ethnic bloodbaths; these should act as warning signals for the 
future if the majority should become too demanding.6 
The problem of ethnicity not being able to translate to nationality became a source 
of instability for the regimes.  Lacking national identities that were stronger than ethnic 
bonds, the regimes had no legitimate control over large ethnic minorities from the other 
Central Asian states that were present inside their states.  Without effective security 
apparatuses, the regimes were unable to enforce national identity to the populace within 
the borders of the individual republics.  This instability was further exacerbated by the 
growth of Islamic fundamentalism within the new republics. 
D. THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL 
For Central Asia, the Islamic revival began in 1989 when Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika loosened communist control and allowed religious 
revival to take place.  “It was a cultural, social and religious phenomenon, as people 
wanted to demonstrate their separateness from the communist system and Slavic 
culture.”7  Before Soviet rule, Islam had been a large part of the culture of Central Asia.  
Central Asia had been the home of vast Islamic empires that once ruled Russia.  Under 
the Soviet Union, Islam was suppressed or, at best, controlled by the state.  Despite this 
suppression, Islam continued to thrive in an underground world.  For the peoples of 
Central Asia, Islam remained not only as a religion but also a part of the defining circle of 
their cultural world. 
While an educated Uzbek or Kazak might fail to observe many of the formal 
rituals such as prayer…he knew that Islam gave him a distinct identity and made 
him what he was…Islam became one of the defining factors of ethnicity.  It 
helped to consolidate the clan and the tribe as well as to create the much broader 
nationality.  Islam reinforced ethnic solidarity and drove a wedge between the 
Russians and the non-Russian Muslims.8 
 
                                                 
6 Rashid, p.241 
7 Ibid, p.244 
8 Ibid, p.42 
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The suppression of Islam under the Soviet regime was designed to create an 
identity based on the Soviet man.  This suppression had the opposite effect, as Islam 
“prospered as a cultural phenomenon that linked people together.”9 
After independence, a cultural and historical memory of Islam emerged into the 
open, “yet popular knowledge of the religion of Islam was minimal and information on 
political activism, ideas and debates in the Islamic world beyond Central Asia was almost 
nonexistent.”10  The bureaucratic structure of Islam supported by the state was unable to 
meet the demand to fund and to support the growing Islamic movement, and the people 
turned elsewhere for guidance and support. 
The vacuum created by the lack of leadership from the state sponsored 
bureaucracies allowed fundamentalist groups to proliferate.  Unofficial Islamic schools 
spread as the Central Asian governments refused to allow Islamic education in the state-
run schools.  Involvement of foreign powers increased as Korans, Islamic literature, and 
mullahs from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan arrived to spread particular versions of 
Islam.  Various Middle Eastern groups began funding the movement as they took 
advantage of the opportunity to spread Islam in the republics.  One example is the 
Kuwait-based “Committee for Muslims in Asia” which sent missions to the Central Asian 
capitals to assess the viability of projects.  The committee offered financial help to 
numerous educational institutes and offered to sponsor students for higher education in 
the Arab states.11  The Muslim Brotherhood now also openly supported the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP) which was legalized in 1990 in Russia, though it still remained 
banned in Central Asia.  Taking advantage of this sponsorship, “The IRP and other 
Islamic groups had no compunction in declaring their intentions to create an Islamic 
system in each republic which, they said, would lead to greater Central Asian unity.  
They considered both the ruling elite and the secular nationalists to be equal threats to 
this task.”12 
                                                 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid, p.244 
11Anthony Hyman. “Central Hyman Asia and the Middle East: The Emerging Links.” Central Asia 
and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union (1994): University of Florida Press: 252 
12 Rashid, p.244-245 
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People bypassed official Islam by building their own mosques, sometimes with 
money collected from the community. 
By October 1990 there were a total of 50 new mosques in Kyrgyzstan compared 
to 15 in 1989, 30 in Turkmenistan compared to 5 before, 40 in Tajikistan 
compared to 17 before.  In Tashkent city, there were 30 new mosques compared 
to just 2 in 1989.  A year later, by October 1991, there were over 1,000 new 
mosques in every republic.13 
For the conservative rulers of Central Asia, the challenge of Islam against their 
goal to create a national identity and the presence of Islamists in the opposition became a 
major problem.  In reaction, the ruling elites refused to comprehend the evolution of 
Islam within the region and refused to accommodate it as part of their political agendas.14  
Their attitudes towards Islam were, to a large part, shaped by the ongoing civil war in 
Tajikstan that matched radical Islamic fundamentalists against the secular government. 
E. THE TAJIKSTAN CIVIL WAR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND 
IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
The civil war in Tajikstan showed the radicalization of the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement and fueled the fears of the Central Asian regimes.  The war claimed close to 
50,000 casualties and created large numbers of refugees that sought safety in neighboring 
Central Asian states.15  The IRP, acting contrary to its declarations that it favored 
democratization, multiparty political systems, human rights, and individual freedom, 
opted for violent methods to solve political problems.  Throughout 1992, the party tried 
to gain military superiority over the ruling secular regime, strengthen its political 
position, place under its own command the republic’s repressive institutions, influence 
the placement of officials in the upper echelons of power, and consolidate itself in the 
structures of local power.16  This would have repercussions throughout Central Asia as 
each of the regimes, fearing Islamic movements within their own republics, tightened 
their suppression and control over the opposition. 
                                                 
13 Ibid, p.45 
14 Ibid, p.244 
15 Ibid 
16 Aziz Niyazi.  “Tajikstan” Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union (1994): University 
of Florida Press: 182-183 
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The civil war also gave outside powers, especially Iran, the opportunity to 
establish influence in Central Asia.  “By the end of 1992 Iran was backing a wide range 
of political parties with money, food and military supplies while Afghan Mujheddin 
groups and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami were also active in training and supplying Islamic 
fundamentalists in [the Tajikstan capital of] Dushanbe.”17  At Dushanbe’s central 
mosque, teachers at the new madrasah claimed that the building was built with Iranian 
funds, that their salaries were paid by Teheran, and that an Islamic militia of 8,000 men 
was created and funded with Iranian aid.  Foreign diplomats also claimed that the IRP 
was receiving airdrops of weapons from Iranian aircraft.  Iranian clout, however, was 
greatly reduced after the Muslim coalition government, which had managed to gain 
power in September 1992, was ousted by secular forces.18 
The damage the Tajik civil war brought against the Islamic revival was 
considerable.  Although Iran was vilified by all of the Central Asian states for its 
involvement in the Tajik civil war, it was not enough to assuage the fears of the regimes.  
The Central Asian governments renewed their efforts to suppress the internal Islamic 
movements within their republics. 
F. REGIME REACTION TO THE TAJIK CIVIL WAR 
The Central Asian governments responded to the growing Islamic movement and 
the Tajik civil war by arresting members of the Islamic opposition, imprisonment, and 
forced exiles.19  The repression did not end there as each government undertook actions 
to mitigate the power of the Islamists. 
In Kazakstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev removed Kazakstan from the 
jurisdiction of the official Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (SADUM), and 
established a separate Kazakstan “muftiate.”  The evidence that this new office was 
conducive to the goals of the state was demonstrated when the head cleric Ratbek 
                                                 
17 Rashid, p.180 
18 Ibid, p.180-181 
19Diane L. Smith. Central Asia: a new Great Game?  http://www.milnet.com/milnet/pentagon/centasia.  
17 June 1996. 
 
10 
Nysanbaev spoke out against the formation of an Islamic party in Kazakstan, claiming 
that the existence of such a party would be a “breach of the peace.”20   
In Uzbekistan, the government responded to the events in Tajikstan by adopting 
in Article 12 of the first Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan the clause that “no 
ideology can be considered as state ideology.”21  Striving to create a secular social 
system, Article 31 of the constitution stated that “Everybody has the right to confess any 
religion or not to confess at all.  It is inadmissible to propagate religious views in a 
compulsory way.”22   
In Kyrgyzstan, the appearance of armed Islamic groups escaping the Tajik civil 
war over the shared border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan became a source of 
conflict between the two republics.  The government was forced to suppress the Islamic 
movement after the head of the Islamic Center in Kyrgyzstan, Sakykjanhadji Kamalov, 
revealed his sympathy for the Islamic fighters.  The regime began a campaign to 
marginalize the power of the Islamists within the republic.23 
In Turkmenistan, President Saparmurad Niyazov steered Turkmenistan’s foreign 
policy away from Iranian influence.    President Niyazov’s first state visit was not to 
fundamentalist Iran, but to secular oriented Turkey.  During his visit to Ankara, President 
Niyazov asked Turkish leaders to send professors of Islam to Turkmenistan “in order to 
prevent radical Iranian Islam from filling the existing vacuum.”24 
In Tajikstan, after the secular neo-communist won power back from the radical 
Islamists, the government actively sought to contain the spread of Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology.  Russia and Kazakstan sought to contain Iranian influence within Tajikstan by 
threatening to lessen their arms trade with the Middle Eastern state.25  The civil war also 
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opened Tajikstan to influence from its neighboring Central Asian states.  Peacekeeping 
forces from Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan were allowed into Tajikistan to 
suppress the opposition, and the civil war justified the stationing of 25,000 Russian 
troops in the republic to protect the peace and patrol Tajikstan’s common border with 
Afghanistan26 – from where the Islamic rebels forayed into Tajikstan or escaped pursuing 
neo-communist forces. 
In the first few years after the civil war began, the governments of Central Asia 
opted for repression and refused to accommodate the Islamic parties within the 
mainstream of the parliamentary opposition.  Banning orders, jail sentences, and decrees 
against the opposition became common.  Although this brought about partial stability, 
democracy suffered because of the regimes’ unwillingness to open the political system to 
varied opposition.  “The result has been that political parties barely exist and their future 
growth has been stunted.”27 
G. INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO GROWING ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM 
“Like the governments of Central Asia, the West, particularly the USA, also 
became unnecessarily hostile [to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism.]”28  During the 
Cold War, the Western powers had used Islam as a means to undermine communist 
influence in Central Asia.  In 1979, the US used the Afghan war to spread Islam in 
Central Asia and undermine communism.  The CIA funded the Mujheddin to smuggle in 
Korans, tape recordings, money, and weapons to Islamic groups in Tajikstan and 
Uzbekistan.29 
After 1991, the West changed tack.  US Secretary of State James Baker publicly 
warned the Central Asian leaders to stay clear of radical Islam and the influence of Iran.  
He urged them to emulate Turkey’s secular model, tying Western aid packages to 
adherence to US wishes.  This encouraged the regimes to increase their rhetoric against 
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the Islamic movement.  The Central Asian governments hoped to gain audience in 
Western capitals and acquire foreign aid by heeding the warning of Secretary Baker.30   
The spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia became a popular threat to 
the new world order in Western media after the Tajik civil war.31  This was also true in 
the Russian media, as Islamic fundamentalism was increasingly portrayed as a threat that 
was spreading in Central Asia and Caucasia.32 
For the West in the early years immediately following the independence of the 
Central Asian states, the need for security and stability within Central Asia overrode the 
need for democracy.  Islamic fundamentalism, especially after the Tajik civil war, was 
perceived as a threat to stability and security in the region.  With stability as the 
overarching goal, the West conveniently ignored the repressive measures the Central 
Asian regimes took to secure their republics against the fundamentalist threat. 
H. THE ROLE ISLAM PLAYS IN THE REBIRTH OF CENTRAL ASIAN 
IDENTITY AND CULTURE 
Although the Tajikstan civil war did show the dangers of radical Islamic 
fundamentalism when it became politicized, there are other explanations for why the civil 
war began.  “Initially portrayed as the result of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the civil 
war is, in reality, less about religion or ideology and more about the economic, linguistic, 
ethnic, clan, and regional rivalries for access to political and economic spoils.”33 
Tajik Islamists were driven as much by clan rivalries, the growth of localism and 
economic deprivation as by their desire to set up an Islamic state.  Local people 
saw the IRP in Tajikstan as a political party first, representing the group interests 
of particular regions and clans, and an Islamic party second.  The fact that the IRP 
was allied to secular nationalist and democratic parties against the neo-communist 
forces appears to prove this.34 
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Although political Islam could be seen as a potential source of instability by the 
regimes in Central Asia, especially when supported by a fundamentalist foreign power, 
the actual threat Islamic fundamentalism poses is arguable. 
Central Asian leaders have exaggerated the incursion of radical Islamic 
fundamentalism and pushed it forward as the new “threat” to justify their 
suppression of internal dissent.  They overstate Central Asian adherence to the 
religious elements of Islam and the potential of Islamic states to export their 
revolution…True, there has been an explosion of mosque building and Koran 
distribution (funded externally, especially by the Saudis), but at this stage much of 
the interest has been in “folk Islam”…and in rediscovering a lost cultural identity, 
rather than a purely religious conviction.35 
When Secretary Baker visited Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 
February 1992, “He discovered that there were no Irans in the making there.  Rather than 
spreading an anti-Western fundamentalist revolution, these three republics were 
‘interested primarily in developing their backward economies’.”36   
The main mistake of many observers to the events transpiring in Central Asia is 
that the Islamic movement is homogeneous.  “Such generalized conclusions are 
inaccurate.  They are even dangerous and may generate misperceptions both about the 
present-day reality and the prospects of social, political, and economic development [of 
Central Asia.]”37 
The development of Islam as a radical fundamentalist monolithic force in Central 
Asia faces many obstacles.  The diversity of ethnicity in each of the republics creates an 
obstacle in that ethnic minorities will not join movements led by ethnic majorities and 
vice versa, making it difficult for the Islamists to build the movement across ethnic lines.   
Central Asia possesses a preponderance of ethnic divisions and rivalries that will militate 
against the unitary form of fundamentalism.  The individual Central Asian states are also 
more or less influenced by Slavic and Western cultures that affect how the religious 
movement will evolve in each of the independent states.  Finally, the examples of 
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Tajikstan and Afghanistan under Islamic regimes remain as important factors in 
dissuading people from joining radical movements.38 
The development of Islam as part of the culture and identity of Central Asia, 
however, continues to grow.   
Islam for the Central Asian region is not a new phenomenon but a basis for the 
unique civilization of the peoples inhabiting the region.  The attempt to eradicate 
Islam – along with Christianity – in Russia was an unnatural effort doomed to 
failure from the beginning.  It should be admitted as erroneous what some 
scientific-analytical centers suggest – that the present day religious renaissance in 
the Central Asian region is exclusively the result of a sharp rise in Islamic 
fundamentalist activities.  Here one should speak about the ways of returning to 
the truly national culture, in the finest sense of the word.39 
Part of the cultural revival in Central Asia is the revival of Sufism, the mystical 
trend of Islam that originated in Central Asia.  Sufism, in its informal expression of faith, 
has gripped the people’s imagination and has provided spiritual sustenance at a time of 
enormous political and economic turmoil.  Within their practice, “the Sufis are playing a 
prominent role in reviving the ancient skills of martial arts, healing through herbal 
medicine, education, publishing ancient poetry and literature, meditation, and yoga.”40  
The fundamentalists, in contrast, have little to offer in terms of promoting old cultural 
skills, but instead promote a Puritanism that is alien to Central Asia.  “People may be 
initially lured by the fundamentalists because of their vast funds and their message of 
revolution, but the beauty of Islam in Central Asia is that it is rooted in culture and 
philosophy and above all tolerance.”41 
I. CONCLUSION 
Serious political, economic, ethnic, and religious challenges confronted the 
Central Asian states as they emerged from the shadow of 70 years of Soviet rule.  With 
independence, the Central Asian governments sought to build political, economic, and 
civic institutions that would provide them with the stability and security they needed to 
continue the process of nation building.  Any sources of instability, however, would 
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threaten that security and stability.  The ethnic reality on the ground and the growth of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the region immediately became sources of instability for the 
regimes as they prevented the consolidation of power and the creation of legitimacy the 
governments desperately sought.   
The presence of large ethnic minorities, many with ties to the Middle East, within 
each of the individual republics coupled with the rapid growth of Islamic fundamentalism 
threatened what little control the governments had within their borders.  The influence of 
foreign powers in the growth of the Islamic revival, and the Tajik civil war that involved 
Islamic militants contributed to the insecurities of the regimes.   
In response, the governments reacted with arrests, imprisonments, and exiles – 
opting to suppress the minorities and the Islamic movements rather than include them in 
the political process.  International reaction also condemned the growing fundamentalist 
movement, as Western powers feared the emergence of another Iran in Central Asia.  In 
the early years following the independence of the region, the United States, despite its 
professed goal of promoting democracy, ignored the repressive measures of the Central 
Asian regimes, opting for stability in each of the republics rather than political diversity 
and participation. 
However, the growing Islamic movement in Central Asia was not a monolithic 
force that threatened the security of the regimes or the stability of the region.  Rather, it 
was part of the cultural revival of the peoples of the Central Asia as they found their 
freedom away from the suppression of Soviet rule.  The regimes in power, unable or 
unwilling to comprehend any movement that would threaten their hold, refused to engage 
this phenomenon, and continue their repression of the perceived threat.  With fragile 
political structures, stagnant economies, inefficient civic institutions, and the inability to 
secure a legitimate hold on power, the governments are unable to break from the cycle of 
intolerance and continue to exercise repressive measures to this day. 
Although in the early years following independence US foreign policy was only 
concerned with stability in Central Asia, US foreign policy gradually evolved as financial 
interests in the Caspian region grew.  In formulating the evolving policy, US foreign 
policy makers recognized the importance of Turkey and Iran to the region, and began 
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engaging Turkey while isolating Iran in the pursuit of US interests in the region.  Turkey, 
as a Middle East ally with ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic ties to Central Asia and 
Caucasia, became the medium for the introduction of US national interests into the 
region.  However, the US sought to mitigate the influence of Iran while also engaging the 































III. THE ROLE OF TURKEY AND IRAN IN US FOREIGN 
POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the independence of the former Soviet 
states in Central Asia and Caucasia, Iran and Turkey have gained significance in the 
region not only because of their shared borders but also because of a shared culture.  The 
Caucasian and Central Asian states, being predominantly Muslim, have more in common 
to the Middle East than with the region’s northern neighbor, Russia, or with its eastern 
neighbor, China.  With a relatively stable, secular government in Turkey, the region’s 
states have looked towards Turkey while continuing to integrate into a world no longer 
dominated by a Cold War mentality.  The region’s physical proximity to Iran has also 
become important, as Iran has tried to bring the region into its sphere of influence.  
Because of United States’ interests in keeping stability within the region and because of 
the region’s economic potential, the United States has engaged Turkey to influence the 
region’s development to the advantage of the US.  Because of Turkey’s importance to the 
US as a Middle East ally, and because of Turkey’s ethnic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic ties with the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the US has used and will 
continue to use Turkey as a medium to advance US interests in the region.  Because of 
the Iranian revolution, the Tajik civil war, and the perceived threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism, the US has actively sought to mitigate the influence of Iran into the 
region.  Future rapprochement or continued tension with Iran will determine to what 
extent the US will influence the region through the Persian Gulf power.   
Until the US can establish a stable presence within the region, US foreign policy 
toward the region will depend on the US’ relationship with both Iran and Turkey.  The 
United States, also wary about its relationship with Russia, will also hope to engage 
Russia to influence how the former superpower will act within its sphere of influence as 




B. THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND CAUCASIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH 
IRAN AND TURKEY 
Under the Soviet Union, links between the Middle East and the Central Asian and 
Caucasian states were limited and controlled from Moscow.  As discussed in chapter II, 
with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the independence of these states in 1991, the 
transborder ethnic, tribal, and national connections of these states to other states in the 
Middle East have become important.  Large ethnic communities, such as the Kurds, that 
are scattered in Central Asia and Caucasia, have links to the communities that live in the 
Middle East.  In addition, migrant communities, such as the Turkomans that were 
expelled from the region after the Russian Revolution of 1917, live throughout the 
Middle East but still have ties to their former homeland. 
For Iran, cultural relations with Azerbaijan are of particular importance.  Azeri 
Turks who live in this state are ethnically and culturally close to those living in the 
adjoining Iranian provinces based in Tabric and Ardebil.  The Azeri Turks form Iran’s 
largest national minority.  Tajikistan has also become important for Iran for cultural 
reasons.  Tajiks are Persian speakers who look to Iran in cultural matters even more than 
any other Central Asia state.42 
Religion, discussed in chapter II, has also gained importance.  With growing 
religious freedom in the former USSR in the mid 1980s, an Islamic revival began in the 
Muslim republics after decades of communist repression and persecution.  Many Middle 
East states sponsored religious missions to the former Soviet republics, and Shia Muslims 
are a majority of the population in Azerbaijan.  However, the secular minded 
governments of these states are more likely to look elsewhere to guide them through their 
stages of development.  The attraction to Turkey, thus, seems justified. 
The ruling elites [of the region] are prepared to look anywhere and everywhere 
for guidance and help in solving their severe problems of development.  They are 
by no means restricted to one country or model, let alone to societies claiming to 
be exemplars of Islam…indeed, the contemporary Iranian or Saudi Arabian 
models of society on offer seem remote, deficient, or even irrelevant to the 
secular-oriented members of the ruling elites of Central Asia.  The basic 
orientation to building a better society in the republics is secular and modernist.43 
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Turkey has deliberately emphasized that their influence in the cultural, economic, 
and political fields is secular.  Drawing from Turkey’s secular based development, 
“Nationalist circles in Turkey take great pride in Ankara’s efforts to woo the Turks of 
Central Asia, efforts that include satellite TV and alphabet reforms away from Cyrillic to 
Latin.”44  Turkey is training one thousand students in its universities in a program that 
takes in students in all grades from six republics.  A total of ten thousand students were 
reportedly studying in Turkey at the beginning of 1993 in the fields of telephone 
communications, infrastructure, transport, and general trading.45   
Turkish business interests in the region are extremely active.  However, in areas 
requiring large-scale investment, notably in gas and oil, Turkish companies are finding 
tough competition against foreign multinationals.  Though Turkey itself has little hard 
currency available for foreign investment, its expertise in industry and manufacturing is 
more impressive than Iran’s.46  Many private Turkish companies are investing and 
trading in the region and the Turkish model of development is the common reference 
point.  Azerbaijan’s former Foreign Minister, Tofik Gasymov, reflecting the sentiment 
that Turkey’s secular model should be the one that Azerbaijan should emulate, declared 
during a visit to Ankara in 1992 that “Turkey is our greatest helper.  We want Turkey’s 
aid in establishing links with the world.”47 
Despite having a government set on religious cornerstones as opposed to Turkey’s 
secular model, Iran still plays a role in the economic development of the region.  Even 
though its economy is stagnant, Iran still has hard currency available because of its 
earnings from oil and gas exports.  Iran’s influence in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan has 
been increased by its geographic position, offering an alternative to reliance for trade 
routes on Russia or through Transcaucasia.  Iran can also help the other landlocked 
Central Asian and Caucasian states by providing access to Iranian ports.  Iran is able to 
expand its railway and freight networks to allow these states to bring their trade to the 
Persian Gulf coast.  Iran, like Turkey, is active in the oil and gas sector, with joint 
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developments with Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea region.  In 1992, Iran signed an 
agreement for bilateral trade and closer economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. 
For Caucasia and Central Asia, then, Iran and Turkey can be seen as models for 
political, social, and economic development.  The two states serve as bridges to the 
outside world.  Because of this, the United States has engaged Turkey while isolating Iran 
in an effort to influence the development of the region.  Whatever actions the United 
States takes in the region, however, cannot ignore the role of the region’s former power, 
Russia. 
In any discussion of foreign relations concerning Central Asia and Caucasia, 
Russia’s complex relationship with the region, preceding from the Soviet era, must be 
taken into consideration.  Much depends on the viability of Russia and the presence of 
substantial Russian minorities in all the states.   
For all the Central Asian states, a major concern is that Moscow may try to regain 
control of the region.  Russia retains enormous residual power to affect events in 
the former Soviet republics.  This residual power is most felt in the area of 
security, where the virtually defenseless Central Asian states remain totally 
dependent on the direct or indirect Russian presence and help.  Thus the new 
Muslim states of the former Soviet Union will remain cognizant of their delicate 
position between Russia and their Muslim brothers in the South…Moscow’s 
interests and preferences will be an important consideration in shaping the 
attitudes of Central Asian states toward the Middle East48 
 
C. PAST AND PRESENT US FOREIGN POLICY 
In March 1999, during a hearing of the House International Relations committee, 
Representative Bereuter, the chairman of the committee, summarized what he accepted to 
be the choices Central Asia faced.  “The Central Asian states are at a critical juncture in 
their political and economic development, balanced between democracy and 
authoritarianism, between a free market economy and systematic corruption, between 
cooperation or resistance to the West.  In short, the region is poised between merging into 
or retreating from the free world order.”49  Representative Bereuter listed three 
challenges that he believed Central Asia would face entering the 21st century: forging a 
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shared national identity from the intermingled ethnic and religious groups, 
institutionalizing political and legal structures that are compatible with democracy, and 
creating a free, open economic system.  Ambassador Steven Sestanovich, speaking to the 
committee as the special adviser to the Secretary of State, summarized America’s foreign 
policy in the region. 
Today the overarching goal of American policy in Central Asia remains securing 
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states of the region.  
To advance this objective, our diplomacy focuses on four key goals: first, the 
formation of democratic political institutions; second, market economic reform; 
third, regional cooperation; and fourth, responsible security policies.50 
Ambassador Sestanovich also addressed the influence of Russia, Iran, and Turkey 
in the region, pointing out the concerns on the spread of Iranian influence into the Central 
Asian states.   
[The leaders of the Central Asian republics] fear an expansion of Iranian influence 
and the rise of violent extremism in their countries…We share it.  There are at the 
same time economic relations that can draw them together, and over the long term 
will be healthy.  Their concern is largely about the creation of an ideological lever 
by Iran, the support for radical groups and movements in their societies.51 
However, in contrast to the view towards Iran, Ambassador Sestanovich believed 
that Russian, Turkish, and US policies in the region could be compatible.   
We have argued that – to both countries, to both the government of Turkey and 
the government of Russia, that properly understood our interests can converge in 
this region…Russian officials are very quick to express their concerns in this area.  
Turkish officials and political figures have the same kinds of concerns.  We can 
have a number of disagreements about how we advance these interests, but I think 
our starting point needs to be a recognition that in many respects we can have 
conversion interests.  We want to pursue those in a way that recognizes and 
respects the independence, sovereignty, [and] territorial integrity of these 
countries.  On that basis, if other countries have the same respect we can work 
together.  If they don’t, we can’t.52 
To support US foreign policy in the region, Ambassador Sestanovich pointed out 
that the United States had assisted Turkey in developing energy transportation pipelines 
in the Caspian region, had given the Central Asian states financial support under the 





auspices of the Freedom Support Act, had increased American presence in the region 
through the establishment of American embassies, and had developed security within the 
region under the NATO exercise Partnership for Peace.   
Despite the high expectations for Central Asia generated in the March 1999 
hearing, another hearing by the same committee held in June 2001, did not reflect the 
same optimism.  Representative Rohrabacher expressed his frustration in what he 
believed to be the extent of US foreign policy in Central Asia.  “There’s been very little 
done in Central Asia by the United States government.  And, because of that, [despite] 
these last 10 years what was a tremendous opportunity for expanding the democratic 
system into the region…I’m afraid that, by all of the criteria in judging how far we’ve 
come, we have not made very much progress.”53 
In examining the results of US foreign policy in the region, the committee 
established that the US had not significantly altered the political development of the 
region to foster democracy and compatibility with the West.  Acting Principal Deputy to 
the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States 
Clifford Bond addressed the concerns of the committee. 
Only by empowering their citizens through democratization and economic reform 
can these governments ensure lasting popular support and stability.  This is an 
integral part of our message to the governments of Central Asia.  
Unfortunately…that progress on reform has been slow and at best uneven.  At one 
extreme…we have the government of Turkmenistan which remains one of the 
most repressive regimes in the world with a stalwartness era of command 
economy and a cultic personality that rivals North Korea’s.  Uzbekistan has 
rejected serious economic reform, and is carrying out repression among the 
independent Muslims that could exacerbate its own security concerns.  
Kazakhstan through its oil wells has achieved macroeconomic stability, but even 
as its government has publicly touted democratic principles, it has progressively 
sought to silence political opponents, the independent media and NGOs.54 
However, in addressing the committee’s concerns on Iranian influence in the 
region, Deputy Bond reflected the views held by Ambassador Sestanovich two years 
earlier.  “Iran’s export of Islamic fundamentalism has been very unwelcomed in Central 
Asia.  The Iranians have been active there, and we’re concerned about that…Central Asia 
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is not fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalism.  The Islamic tradition in these countries 
is a very tolerant one.”55  Despite this assessment of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism’s 
influence in the region, Deputy Bond did see how Islamic fundamentalism could be used 
as a political force against the repressive governments.  “We do not see Islamic 
fundamentalism right now as a threat to the states of Central Asia, but that the policies 
that are being pursued by the governments now are driving the young, particularly 
because there’s a lack of economic opportunity, into the arms of the extremists.”56 
Regardless of the optimism for Central Asia generated in the March 1999 hearing 
during the Clinton administration, the House International Relations Committee did not 
share the same outlook two years later.  Although the goals of American foreign policy 
remained the same, the committee echoed frustration about the region and its lack of 
political reform.  The region also had not demonstrated the ability to cooperate as one 
entity or hold responsible security policies.   
However, for the committee members and audience in both hearings, the spread 
of Iranian influence and Islamic fundamentalism seemed to be checked, and the 
development of parts of the region through economic ties was slowly progressing in a 
desired direction.  One economic policy that appeared to be serving US goals within the 
area was the development of energy pipelines with Turkey in the Caspian region. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASPIAN REGION 
An agreement in November 1999 for the opening of energy pipelines from the 
Caspian region to the Mediterranean through Turkey between the governments of 
Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan was hailed by the Clinton administration as a foreign 
policy triumph.  Former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, reflecting the administration’s 
enthusiasm, said, “This is not just another oil and gas deal, and this is not just another 
pipeline.  It is a strategic framework that advances America’s national security interests.  
It is a strategic vision for the future of the Caspian region.”57  The Caspian basin is 
believed to hold between 15 billion to 30 billion barrels of reserves, and the Clinton 
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administration’s aim was “to secure US access to the Caspian basin and to extend 
American commercial and political interests into the Caucasus and Central Asia.”58   
The Clinton administration’s unstated goal also appears to have been to keep 
Russian and Iranian influence out of the region.  Robert Ebel, an energy specialist at the 
Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, summed up the administration’s aim in 
influencing the decision for the pipeline route, “Anywhere but Iran.”59  Although an 
Iranian pipeline offers the cheapest alternative, US sanctions against Iran make the 
pipeline impossible to build.60  Opposing the Russians, the Clinton administration faced a 
different challenge. 
Having lost possession of the natural riches of its former republics, powerful 
Russians sought to continue to control them…Moscow’s main lever of power, 
then as now, was its pipeline system, a remnant of the centralized Soviet economy 
in which all oil and natural gas from the Caspian first traversed Russia before 
passing on to the West.61 
Against the agreement signed by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in November 
1999, Moscow continued to advocate enlargement of an existing northern pipeline to 
Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossisk.  However, Russia would face opposition from 
the Clinton administration.  “American assertiveness has been to shrink Russia’s 
backyard so that when Russia gets back on its feet, it cannot march back into the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.”62 
The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline that the three states agreed to build would completely 
bypass any region that Russia could influence.  It would begin at Azerbaijan’s capital, 
Baku, cross over Georgia and Turkey, and end at the Turkish Mediterranean port of 
Ceyhan.  In addition to the oil from Azerbaijan, American negotiators have also been 
pressing Kazakhstan to send its oil and gas to Baku through an undersea link where it will 
be transported through the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline.  The projected completion of the 
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project is in 2004.  The opening of a pipeline in April 1999 that linked Baku to Georgian 
Black Sea port of Supsa had already taken revenue away from Russia.63  With the 
completion of Baku-Ceyhan, Russian oil revenues from the area would be severely 
hampered, together with Russian influence.   
Although agreement has been reached to begin the project, financing for the 
project has not been finalized.  The Turkish government, recognizing the importance of 
the project for Turkey, assumed the liability for the project should it exceed the projected 
$1.4 billion.  However, Turkey currently faces a grave financial crisis, in which the 
United States, in furthering its own national interests, is willing to help. 
E. TURKEY AND PIPELINE POLITICS 
Apart from satiating Turkey’s need for energy, the development of new pipelines 
to transport oil and gas to western markets through its territory would enhance Turkey’s 
regional power.  Any enhancement of Turkey’s influence within the region would benefit 
the United States by furthering US national interests.  However, given Turkey’s 
economic problems, The United States, as Turkey’s strongest ally, needed to exert 
pressure with the oil companies to finance the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline. 
Among western oil companies, some of which feel they were brow beaten with 
the help of US pressure into backing Baku-Ceyhan, doubts still persist, however, 
about the project’s commercial viability.  US government pressure is again likely 
to be brought to bear, this time in encouraging banks to finance the proposed 
pipelines.  “These projects are an extension of US foreign policy,” argues one 
European banker.  “This is why you will see US banks involved.”64 
Given the importance of the pipeline in enhancing US influence within Caucasia 
and Central Asia, the United States was willing to exert pressure on any economic 
institution to further its national interests, including exerting pressure on the International 
Monetary Fund to assist Turkey in its current financial crisis.  In March 2001, the IMF 
enlarged the credit line available to Turkey from $3.8 billion to $11.4 billion.65 
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Turkey is viewed in Washington as one of the developing countries most vital to 
American interests.  From this traditional national security standpoint, Turkey is 
viewed as a linchpin for US strategic interests…It forms the eastern flank of 
NATO, and has been seen as presenting a counterweight to its neighbor Russia in 
the unstable regions to its east – and, as such, the center of the east-west US 
energy policy in the oil and gas rich Caspian region.66 
For the United States and for the new Bush administration, Turkey’s importance 
in the geopolitics of the region are too important to allow Turkey to stagnate in economic 
crisis.67  However, US foreign policy towards Iran, when compared to Turkey, in regards 
to Central Asia and Caucasia is much more complex situation when taking into account 
the opposition to the continued sanctions against Iran and the re-election of Iran’s 
reformist president Mohammed Khatami. 
F. IRANIAN GOALS AND US SANCTIONS 
In an article in the Iranian newspaper Resalat, Gholamreza Mohammadi, an 
Iranian international affairs analyst, contented that outside powers such as the United 
States and the European Union have actively pursued the prevention of ties between Iran 
and Central Asia.  Outlining the activities the United States had taken to undermine 
Iranian influence within the region, Mohammadi listed several actions:  the US’ use of 
sanctions; its threats and promises to sovereign states to keep Iran isolated; its efforts to 
prevent oil pipelines from the region to cross Iran to the world market; its economic 
support and development of Turkey’s oil infrastructure; and its backing of Turkey’s and 
Israel’s political and economic activities within the region.  Contending that Iran was far 
behind Turkey and the US in influencing the region, Mohammadi recommended that 
Iranian policy makers concentrate on decreasing the negative publicity of Iran concerning 
the dissemination of Islamic thought, and on the need to bolster Iranian economic activity 
within the region by strengthening the diplomatic missions there.68   
Even if Iran is successful in improving its Islamic image and in establishing 
stronger economic ties with Caucasia and the Central Asian states, continued US 
sanctions against Iran will not allow the state to generate the substantial revenue needed 
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to influence the region away from its secular, pro-western stance.  For Iran’s foreign 
policy to succeed within the region, Iran must also overcome the general skepticism and 
suspicion of Iranian goals that the region’s elite hold.  US sanctions against Iran have hurt 
the state as evidenced by Iran’s official complain to the United Nations General 
Assembly claiming that “[US sanctions] have ‘led to the disruption of Iran’s economy…a 
decline in the growth of the country’s gross national product…[and] a scarcity of 
essential goods needed for the improvement of the nutritional and health care standards 
of the Iranian people.”69  Like Turkey, Iran also faces its own financial problems.  Unlike 
Turkey, however, Iran does not enjoy the support of the United States to allow it to 
pursue its foreign policy agenda.  Instead, the US actively pursues the isolation of Iran.  
This isolation, however, is not without an opposition. 
In a letter to President Clinton signed by 15 senators and 17 members of Congress 
in January 1999, Senator Larry Craig urged the President to issue a special license to 
allow a US company to sell $500 million worth of American grain to Iran.  In the letter, 
Senator Craig forwarded the argument that the transaction “may result in several positive 
effects, including…demonstrating to the Iranian government an example of positive 
results which stem from acceptable standards of international behavior.”70  This letter 
was not the first sign of the faltering strength of the sanctions imposed against Iran, nor 
would it be the last. 
In November 1997, the Clinton administration had felt pressure from Congress to 
impose sanctions against CFP-Total of France and Russia’s Gazprom for their $2 billion 
gas investment deal with Iran, a transaction that could have significance to Iran’s 
influence in Central Asia and Caucasia.  However, the administration also felt pressure 
from Russia not to impose sanctions against its company.  After the United Nations 
formally dropped sanctions against Libya in April 1999 following Libya’s release of the 
two primary suspects of the 1988 Lokerbie bombing, pressure mounted on the Clinton 
administration to end the continued isolation of Iran through the Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act.  Finally, in May 1999, Mobil Oil forwarded the argument that continued sanctions 
against Iran served to hurt US companies in the long term.  “US-Iran rapprochement 
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would go a long way to bolster regional harmony…We believe sanctions harm innocent 
civilians, not the perpetrators, cost American companies sales and jobs, and can frustrate 
our allies.  Maintaining sanctions on Iran while foreign companies can invest there with 
no restrictions not only puts American companies on the sidelines but, more importantly, 
weakens America’s foreign policy in the region.”71  The sanctions effectively did not 
allow US companies to invest in any lucrative transactions, allowing other countries to 
gain influence in Iran.  This included the development of Iran’s transportation 
infrastructure into Central Asia, which could develop without American influence, 
effectively mitigating US geopolitical goals in the region. 
After the Clinton administration, the Bush administration researched the viability 
of continued sanctions against Iran.  An energy task force, headed by Vice President Dick 
Cheney broached the possibility of lifting sanctions in an effort to increase the US oil 
supply.  Although the 10 April 2001 draft acknowledged the importance of sanctions in 
advancing national security and diplomatic goals, it also added that the UN sanctions on 
Iraq and US restrictions on energy investment on Libya and Iran “affect[ed] some of the 
most important existing and prospective petroleum producing countries in the world,”72 
including the landlocked Central Asian states.  Though he did not rule out lifting 
sanctions, President Bush said that he had no immediate plans to do so.73  The task 
force’s draft recommendations came during a debate in Congress over the practicality of 
renewing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for five more years after it expires in August 
2001.  Supporting the lifting of the act are many US oil companies that want to develop 
Central Asia through Iran. 
G. PRESIDENT MOHAMMED KHATAMI, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. 
BUSH AND POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT  
With the decisive re-election of Iran reformist President Mohammed Khatami, the 
prospects of better relations between the US and Iran and the lifting of sanctions seem 
closer.  However, the popular Iranian President “must address [the] demands for greater 
democracy, integration with the outside world and a rethinking of the country’s religious 
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form of government,”74 domestically and abroad.  He must also contend with Iran’s 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameni, whose conservative outlook may derail 
whatever international or domestic reforms President Khatami might propose. 
At stake is the peaceful evolution of a country that is a powerful influence in one 
of the world’s most volatile regions and – despite not having any formal ties with 
the United States over the last two decades – remains a potent factor in US 
foreign policy on critical issues, including the Middle East Peace process, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and global oil and gas 
supplies.75 
In the United States, President Bush is also faced with pressure to review the 
United States’ foreign policy toward Iran.  With the pressure to lift sanctions coming 
from international and domestic sources, the new administration is faced with the choice 
to engage Iran rather than isolate the country as the US has done for the last two decades. 
The Islamic Republic is of enormous strategic importance to the United States and 
its friends and allies.  Sixty-five percent of the world’s known oil reserves lie below and 
around the Gulf.  Iran has the second largest national gas reserves in the world.  The 
Caspian Sea’s potential oil and gas reserves are estimated at $4 trillion.  Ultimately, no 
policy for Caspian energy can ignore Iran…The United States should continue to try to 
prevent the import of weapons of mass destruction into Iran, but it should lift other 
sanctions that not only block American corporations from trading with Iran but also allow 
penalties against foreign companies that invest in its oil industry.76 
H. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 
Raymond Garthoff, a retired senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and a former 
ambassador to Bulgaria, summarized in an editorial to the Los Angeles Times Russian 
President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy to the West, including the United States. 
What can we expect from Putin’s foreign policy?  He will, as he should, pursue 
Russian national interests.  Yet, he will not, by choice, pursue an anti-Western 
policy, nor will he seek to establish hegemony over former Soviet republics.  
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There will, however, be some friction when Russian national interests conflict 
with other countries’, including the US.77 
Ambassador Garthoff, despite this outlook, also signified Russia’s concerns over 
American actions in the Caspian region.   
One significant area of growing US-Russian friction arises from the US role in the 
exploitation and transportation of the oil and gas in the Caspian Basin…Vigorous 
US diplomatic maneuvering, often with an ill-concealed anti-Russian element, has 
provoked Moscow’s concern and resentment.  This is heightened when 
accompanied by such things as a US military presence through the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace training programs.  Putin will seek to 
protect Russian interests in the region, preferably cooperatively with the US, but, 
if necessary, competitively.78 
One area that is a definite concern for Washington is the growing relationship 
between Russia and Iran and Russia’s willingness to export to Iran weapons that could be 
used to further Iran’s influence in the Central Asian and Caucasian region.  The visit of 
Marshall Igor Sergeyev, Russia’s defense minister, to Iran in December 2000, was hailed 
the Iranian newspaper Javan as a new chapter in relations between the two countries.  
During the visit, both countries agreed to cooperate in the areas of defense to promote 
peace and security while standing together against any regional challenges.  Both 
countries unilaterally rejected the Gore-Chernomydrin Convention established in 1995 
which prohibited Russia from selling weapons to Iran or giving the country military, 
scientific, and technical information.  The convention, drawn up by former Vice 
President Al Gore, was one device the US had employed to continue the isolation of Iran. 
For Javan, the initiation of informational, strategic, and defense cooperation 
between Russia and Iran was a “symbol of exterminating the interfering policies of non-
regional countries in the domestic affairs of and relations between regional countries.”79  
In summarizing Russia’s goals for the new cooperation between the two states, Javan 
asserted that Russia understood that Iran was an appropriate market for the export of 
military weapons, including missiles, from the impoverished Russian military industrial 
establishment; that Iran could supply the financial needs of Russia in exchange for 
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nuclear reactor technology; that Iran could prevent NATO from expanding into Central 
Asia; and that Iran could be used as a bulwark against US’ and Turkish cooperation in the 
Caspian region and the growing US influence in Central Asia.80 
Although US officials have demanded of Russia assurances that any Russian-
Iranian arms sale would not lead to the transfer of nuclear weapons technology or 
improvement of Iran’s Shahad-3 missile, in practical terms, Russia is eager to gain access 
into Iran’s $10 billion budget surplus due to higher oil prices.81  However, despite the 
agreement to sell arms to Iran, Russia is not unconcerned about what the growing 
relationship could lead to. 
The debate over Mr. Putin’s headlong rush to capture the Iranian market for 
Russia’s beleaguered arms and energy industries is not yet as intense as the 
American reaction to it…but a sense of danger is growing based in part on the 
fear that Iran’s moderates will lose power, putting Russian weapons in the hands 
of hard-liners who might point them at Central Asia or use them to incite Russia’s 
Muslim population.82 
This apprehension in Russia is also fueled by the perceived uneasiness of relations 
between the Washington and Moscow, as the Bush administration pressures Iran over its 
“support for terrorism, and Tehran’s efforts to develop long-range ballistic missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction.”83  Andrei Kozyrev, former Russian Foreign Minister 
under President Boris Yeltsin, pointed out that while Russia has no other choice but to do 
business with Iran, it should do so in while addressing US’ concerns about the spread of 
dangerous weapons technologies. 
In the first meeting between Russian President Putin and US President Bush on 16 
June 2001, the issue of arms proliferation was broached by President Bush.  The United 
States suspects Russia of shipping high-grade aluminum, used to produce uranium, to 
Iran.  Although the summit did not produce conclusive results, both presidents agreed to 
commission ministers to begin working on a new security framework taking into account 
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the threats from “rogue” nations such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.  “We want Russia to 
be a partner and an ally, a partner in peace, a partner in democracy, a country that 
embraces freedom,”84 President Bush said at a news conference on 15 June 2001.  
President Putin, reflecting President Bush’s sentiments, said after the summit that the two 
countries “are not enemies, they do not threaten each other and they could be fully good 
allies…they bear a special responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, 
for building a new architecture of security in the world.”85 
Although Russia sees Iran as a market for its arms and energy industries for 
pragmatic reasons, there is caution in Moscow on selling or providing technologies to a 
state that could turn those technologies against Russian interests.  Russia shares the 
responsibility along with the other countries in the region to keep the states in Caucasia 
and Central Asia independent and stable.  Taking into account the concerns of the United 
States, President Putin pledged to begin work on a new security framework that would 
include the proliferation of weapons in Central Asia and Caucasia while ensuring that the 
United States understood Russian concerns over US actions in the region where Russia 
still considers itself to be a major power. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Because of the United States’ stated goal of securing the sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity of the states of Central Asia and Caucasia, the US 
has engaged Turkey to further American influence into the region.  US diplomacy has 
focused on the formation of democratic political institutions, market economic reform, 
regional cooperation, and responsible security policies.  Although the United States has 
not been successful in all areas, American influence into the region is progressing slowly 
due to America’s influence on Turkey and Turkey’s pipeline politics.  While this has 
progressed the development of the region’s states through a secular Middle Eastern 
model, growing US and Turkish influence in the region has alarmed Iran and Russia.   
In the past two decades, the United States has sought to isolate Iran from 
becoming a factor in world dynamics.  However, with the election of reformer President 
Mohammed Khatami in Iran in June 2001, and with growing pressure to lift sanctions 
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against Iran from the domestic energy industry, President Bush has not ruled out the 
possibility of rapprochement with the Islamic republic.  The Iranian presence in Central 
Asia and Caucasia has been largely mitigated due to America’s economic policies in 
isolating Iran and not allowing the country the substantial revenue to develop economic 
ties within the region that would further Iran’s influence.  Only reforms in Iran and 
American perception of the Persian Gulf power will determine if Iran will become a 
constructive, dynamic factor in US foreign policy in Central Asia and Caucasia. 
Understanding the role Russia has played in the region’s history and 
understanding that Russia is still a power in Caucasia and Central Asia, the current 
administration seeks to engage Russia in building security within the region while 
mitigating the proliferation of weapons that could be detrimental for both states’ interests.  
However, because of the commercial interests of both countries in the energy rich 
Caspian, the two states may find themselves in competition to harvest the riches of the 
region.   
US influence through its foreign policy in the region has grown slowly.  With 
complex relationships with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, the United States will remain 
engaged in this new Great Game in Caucasia and Central Asia to further American 
geopolitical interests within the region. 
Competition between the regional powers, however, is not limited to the 
economic field.  As influence from the regional powers grow, the possibilities for 
conflict, even military confrontation, multiply.  The extreme possibility of armed conflict 
can readily be seen in a case study of the continuing dispute between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh.  As shown in the following chapter, 
the problems of ethnic divisions within the sovereign borders of Azerbaijan grew to 
include not only the belligerent states but also the regional powers Turkey, Iran, and 
Russia.  The threat to US interests in the area was sufficient to prompt US involvement.  
As the regional powers competed to promote national interests, secure borders, and 
expand influence into the region, the new Great Game took a dangerous turn which pitted 






























IV. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the independence of the former Soviet 
states of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991, the dispute between the Armenians and the 
Azerbaijanis over the Nagorno-Karabakh region escalated into open warfare between the 
two new republics in the autumn of that year.  After a cease-fire took hold in May 1994, 
the Azerbaijani government began to attract investment into the region from Western oil 
companies seeking to tap into Azerbaijan’s energy reserves beneath the Caspian Sea.  
Political interests soon followed economic interests as the governments of Europe and the 
United States sought to lessen their dependence on oil supplies from the volatile Persian 
Gulf and to support the development of independent states in the former Soviet Union.  
However, even after the cease-fire, the conflict simmered under the surface as the 
Christian Armenian populace in Nagorno-Karabakh still sought independence from 
predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan.  With the continuing conflict arraying various foreign 
powers against each other, the dispute serves as a dangerous precedent for future conflict 
among the regional powers that could lead to a wider war in Central Asia and Caucasia – 
one that could involve the United States against nuclear-armed  Russia. 
With Western interest in the region on the rise, new momentum was given to 
finding a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and the Azerbaijani government 
was emboldened with the belief that Western governments along with Turkey would help 
it achieve diplomatically what it had failed to achieve on the battlefield.86  Stability 
within the region would serve the objectives of outside powers as they seek to develop 
the region economically.  However, the entrance of Western powers has complicated 
rather than improved the situation, as competition between regional powers for influence 
into Caucasia has grown.  
Two blocs have evolved.  Western influence through the United States and 
Turkey has increased to develop the region’s economic potential and to support the 
independent political development of the Caucasian and Central Asian states along 
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Russia’s southern border.  Opposing this intrusion into the region, both Russia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran have sought to lessen the growing influence of Western powers 
in the region they regard as within their spheres of influence.  With competing interests 
and objectives, the United States and Turkey have found themselves in conflict with 
Russia and Iran as both blocs seek to influence and to develop the region to the advantage 
of their state interests.  The actions of both blocs in the current Armenian-Azerbaijani 
dispute serve as an example of the growing competition between the powers.  How each 
bloc deals with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has set a potentially dangerous precedent 
for the other states of the former Soviet Union in their individual developments as 
independent states in their relations with foreign powers. 
B. THE DIVIDED REGION 
Situated strategically between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Caucasia, over 
the centuries, has been subjected to foreign conquests, and continues to be fragmented 
along ethnic and cultural lines.  Human migration, competition between surrounding 
states, and expansion by more powerful neighbors has had a great impact upon the 
development of perceptions and upon the self-identity and historical experience of the 
peoples of the Caucasia, including Nagorno-Karabakh.87 
For the Azeris, the effects of migrations and imperial rivalries led to a close 
identification with two powers that ruled them historically – Turkey and Iran.  “By the 
end of the eleventh century, the early Azeris looked culturally toward Iran, religiously 
toward the larger Muslim world, and linguistically and ethnically toward the Turkic 
world.”88  In contrast, these same historic migrations and imperial rivalries led to the rise 
of a distinct Armenian identity.  This was very evident in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
When the Sassanid presence in Transcaucasia was usurped by that of the Arabs in 
the seventh century, the Armenians of mountainous Karabakh continued to 
preserve their traditions and cling to a semi-autonomous existence while the rest 
of their countrymen were befallen by foreign rule.  Over the next one thousand 
years, this precedent of Armenian autonomy was upheld, making Nagorno-
Karabakh the only part of historic Armenia “where a tradition of national identity 
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was preserved unbroken until the medieval period.”  Thus, the Armenians’ strong 
emotional and nationalistic attachment to the land is clear.89 
However, Azeri scholars refuse to accept the Armenian claim that the inhabitants 
of Nagorno-Karabakh have been ethnically Armenian since earliest times.  These 
scholars argue that “beginning in the eight century, immigrating Armenians forced the 
cultural, linguistic, and religious assimilation of the indigenous Albanian population of 
Karabakh…modern Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are not Armenians per 
se, but are Armenianized Albanians, and thus, Azerbaijanis.”90 
The relations between the two peoples remained peaceful throughout the 
centuries.  However, the divisions between the two groups were manifested during the 
period of Russian rule beginning in 1805, as Azeris perceived that the Armenians were 
treated as a privileged class by the conquerors.  Nagorno-Karabakh became a region of 
contention as each side laid claim to the area.  Relations soured between Armenians and 
Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh in the late 19th and early 20th century.  This growing 
quarrel briefly flared into open conflict at the end of the First World War before being 
suppressed under Soviet rule for most of the 20th century. 
After Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev initiated reforms in the Soviet Union in 
the 1980’s, nationalist movements began in many of the Soviet republics.  Amid this 
climate, the Soviet of People’s Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution by a 
vote of 110-17 requesting the region’s transfer to the Armenian SSR on 20 February 
1988.  The Soviet Central Committee in Moscow responded negatively to the request, 
though the Gorbachev regime offered some concessions to the Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh.   Although the prospect of increased economic, social, and cultural 
developments was welcomed, any measure short of full union was inadequate for the 
growing nationalistic fervor in Armenia and in the disputed region, and the conflict 
simmered under the surface for another three years before independence was given to 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991. 
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C. AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN SECURITY 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh continued to be viewed 
by Azeris as a historically vital and inseparable part of Azerbaijan.  While a perceived 
challenge to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity continued from the Cold War after 
independence, the threat of an internal challenge to the new state’s boundaries grew. 
Unlike Armenia, which is mostly ethnically homogenous, Azerbaijan is a 
conglomeration of peoples of varying ethnicity, language, and religion and confronts the 
same internal challenges of ethnicity that pose problems for its Central Asian neighbors 
across the Caspian Sea.  Besides the Armenian population within Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan contains three major ethnic groups.  In the north are the Lezgin, a Sunni 
Muslim people who number close to 200,000 in a 1989 Soviet census.  To the southeast 
are 20,000 Talysh, an Iranian people whose language belongs to the northwest Iranian 
language group, and in the southwest are 12,000 Kurds that share close ties to the 
Kurdish populations in Armenia, Turkey, and Iran.  This diversity posed a number of 
potential problems for Azerbaijan’s leaders after independence as the presence of large, 
diverse ethnic groups complicated the development of a sense of national identity for the 
newly independent republic.91  The independence movement in Nagorno-Karabakh 
region posed a significant challenge to the territorial integrity of the state, and set a 
precedent for how Azerbaijan’s new leaders would deal with other independence 
movements that might arise from other ethnic groups within the bounds of the republic. 
In light of the perceived dangers to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity posed by the 
republic’s non-titular, non-Armenian minorities, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem 
heightened the sense of vulnerability of post-Soviet Azerbaijani leaders.  With the 
Karabakh Armenians engaged in an active campaign to break away from the 
Azerbaijan and join Armenia, the precedent was set for similar movements to 
arise among the Talysh, Lezgin, and Kurdish peoples.92 
For Armenia, the realities of independence did not change the perspective that 
Nagorno-Karabakh represented a stronghold where a tradition of Armenian national 
sovereignty was preserved nearly unbroken.  However, the official Armenian goal of 
achieving political union with Nagorno-Karabakh was changed to obtaining self-
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determination for the Armenian population of the region.  All claims to Azerbaijani 
territory were renounced, and Armenia refused to be the first state to recognize the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent republic, declaring that “such an act would 
appear to the world as an encroachment upon the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.”93  
This new strategy was aimed at altering the international perception of the Armenia-
Azerbaijan conflict by seeking to avoid creating the impression that Armenia had any 
designs on the territory of Azerbaijan, thereby making Armenia a direct party to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.  The Armenian government could now deny direct 
involvement in hostilities and could argue that Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians should be 
allowed to represent themselves in any future negotiations concerning the governing of 
the region.94  Because of the region’s economic potential, however, the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh would not remain long as a dispute only involving the main 
belligerents, but would expand to include Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the United States. 
D. REGIONAL DYNAMICS REVISITED 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey looked to Central Asia and 
Caucasia as areas into which it could spread its influence.  Turkey stressed its historical 
and linguistic ties with the Turkic peoples of the two regions, and portrayed itself as a 
model of a Westernized, secular, market-oriented democracy that the newly independent 
Muslim states could follow in their transition from Soviet rule.  Other factors were also 
involved in determining Ankara’s increased presence within Central Asia and Caucasia. 
As the USSR declined in the late 1980’s, Turkey increasingly began to feel that 
its geostrategic value as an ally within NATO and to the West was declining.  With the 
end of the Cold War, finding a new role for Turkey that would ensure its continued 
importance as an ally became extremely important.  Becoming a bridge between the West 
and former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Cauasia became the role Ankara adapted 
to fit within the framework of Western strategy.95 
An important calculation for Turkey was an economic one.  The former Soviet 
republics became new markets for Turkish goods.  Significantly, the states of Azerbaijan, 
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Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan possessed large reserves of oil and natural gas, resources 
that would alleviate Turkey’s need for energy.  Through its relations with the West, 
Turkey was offering the Caspian Sea littoral states access to European and American 
markets while providing investment opportunities to western companies seeking to 
develop the region’s energy resources.  Turkish pipelines and transit revenues from 
shipment of oil and gas to the Mediterranean Sea would also be lucrative for the Turkish 
economy.   
The final calculation for Turkey concerned its security.  For Ankara, Central Asia 
and Caucasia represented “a very important security region for Turkey.  Therefore, the 
protection of political stability in these republics is a basic element of Turkey’s policy 
regarding the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics.”96    Central to Turkish concerns 
was the potential of nationalist conflict close to its borders.  The Armenian-Azerbaijan 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh represented such a conflict, and Ankara feared that a 
spillover of the violence between the belligerent states would force it to get directly 
involved to protect its territorial integrity, undermining regional peace and development.  
Hoping to control the border threat while developing ties, Turkey expanded its political 
and economic influence into Azerbaijan and into the region.  Growing Turkish influence 
into the region, however, would be seen as a threat by Russia and Turkey’s Middle East 
neighbor, Iran. 
Like Turkey, Iran viewed the breakup of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to 
expand its influence into Central Asia and Caucasia.  Iran, hoping to break away from the 
isolation that had been imposed on the country since the Iranian revolution, also sought to 
build new economic and political ties with the two regions, and offered the new republics 
access to the Persian Gulf through the use of the Iranian transportation network.  Just as 
Azerbaijan served as a link for Turkey to the Caspian region and to Central Asia, Iran 
also saw the geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan for its designs on the region. 
Iran also had its own security concerns.  One concern is the existence of a 
significant number of Azeris living inside Iran’s northern border.  Although the 15 
million Azeris are well integrated into Iranian society and show little desire to secede, the 
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matter is still a cause for worry for Tehran should there ever be a call for union with 
Azerbaijan from this Azeri population.  In terms of security, any instability within 
neighboring Azerbaijan that could cause unrest among Iran’s Azeri populace became a 
concern for Tehran.  The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, so close to Iran’s northern border, 
posed such a problem.   
These cross-border ties with Iran also worried Azerbaijan.  Although the Azeris 
hold linguistic ties with the Turks, many Azeris identify culturally and religiously with 
Iran.  Azerbaijan is the only former Soviet republic where Shi’a Islam is practiced by the 
majority of the populace (70 percent).  Because of this, Azerbaijan is perceived as 
potentially fertile territory for expansion of Iranian influence into Caucasia.  Any 
significant Iranian influence in Azerbaijan would allow Tehran to block any Turkish 
designs in the Caspian region and into Central Asia.97  However, for both Turkey and 
Iran, any calculations into Central Asia and Caucasia would have to take into account 
Russian influence in the region, as Russia still regarded all its former republics as within 
its sphere of influence. 
Russian interests within Central Asia and Caucasia have been framed in terms of 
Russian security and strategic goals.  A broad consensus has emerged in Russia around 
the concept that the former Soviet states in Central Asia and Caucasia are part of a sphere 
of vital interests for Russia within which Moscow has responsibilities to act to maintain 
peace and security. 
Most Russian political and military leaders view the Transcaucasus as a key 
region of the “Near Abroad” due to its position both as a key land bridge among 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and as a crucial border area along Russia’s 
Caucasian underbelly.  What follows from this perception are two primary 
Russian geostrategic interests in the Transcaucasus: The maintenance of stability 
on the Russian Federation’s southern flank and the expansion and consolidation 
of Russian influence in the Transcaucasus at the expense of other international 
actors.98 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders have shown concern over 
the potential for ethnic conflict in Caucasia.  Accompanying this concern has been focus 
on the potential rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the former republics.  Russia fears that 
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Islamic extremism, once rooted in the southern republics, could also grow among 
Russia’s significant Muslim population, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of 
Russia. 
Underlying Russia’s need for stability in the region is the perceived need to 
maintain Russia’s predominance across its former republics.  In order to achieve this 
goal, a number of conditions have to be met: Russia must become the chief intermediary 
between the former Soviet states and the outside world; no other country or international 
organization can be allowed to rival the influence of Russia in the region; the rise of 
potential threats to Russian security or ascendancy must be prevented; Moscow must 
become the sole peacemaker and peacekeeper in Central Asia and Caucasia; and, lastly, 
the former republics have to be maintained within Russia’s sphere of economic influence.  
When applied to Caucasia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, these conditions dictated 
the Russia must be engaged deeply in the region.  Russia must achieve a position of 
prominence in the foreign policies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan and must attempt to 
resolve the regional conflict while constraining the growth of foreign influence into the 
region and building it’s own political and economic links with the two republics.99 
In summary, Turkey, Iran, and Russia, after 1991, each pursued geopolitical goals 
in Central Asia and Caucasia.  Although many motives for the expansion of each 
country’s influence are grounded on security concerns, each of the regional powers also 
sought to gain from their relationships with the former Soviet republics through political 
and economic ties.  With each country pursuing its own interests, it was inevitable that 
conflict in whatever form would occur between the regional powers.  The Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict became a focus for the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran, and Russia, as 
each sought to gain influence in the region while serving as a mediatory or as a direct 
actor.  The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh would 
provide a precedent on how these regional powers, along with the United States, would 
deal with conflict in Central Asia and Caucasia. 
E. 1991-1994 
In the autumn of 1991, the Armenian leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed 
rno-Karabakh republic, and called for its recognition from the independence of the Nago                                                 
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Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Military hostilities again erupted between the Armenian 
militias defending the region and the Azeri military.  In March 1992, after the success of 
Armenian troops in capturing the strategic city of Khodjaly, Azeri President Ayaz 
Mutalibov resigned under pressure from his opponents.  The Azeri forces, poorly 
organized and disjointed, suffered numerous defeats and lost the strategic city of Lachin 
in May 1992. 
The fall of Lachin allowed a physical corridor to be created between Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, ending the isolation of the region from Armenia that had been 
imposed by Stalin in 1923, and turning Armenia, despite its diplomatic maneuvering to 
give the impression that it was not involved in the internal affairs of a neighboring state, 
into a direct actor in the conflict.  However, the occupation of Lachin now meant that 
Armenian forces occupied Azeri territory, in clear violation of the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan. 
Building on their success, Armenian forces attacked the Azeri autonomous 
republic of Nakhichevan in the same month as the capture of Lachin.  This attack now 
brought the conflict to Turkey’s border and threatened the physical link between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan.   The offensive forced Ankara to react.  Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demirel pledged unspecified aid to Nakhichevan, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
issued a warning to Armenia.  Although there was little indication that Turkey was 
preparing for military action, the Turkish action prompted a response from Russia. 
In a clear reference to Turkey, the CIS Joint Armed Forces warned on 20 May 
that “third party intervention in the dispute [between Armenia and Azerbaijan] could 
trigger a Third World War.”100  The basis for the warning was the Treaty of Collective 
Security concluded in Tashkent on 15 May between Russia, Armenia, and four of the 
former Soviet republics.  According to the provisions of the treaty, an attack on Armenia 
would be treated as an attack on Russia.  Significant to this development was the fact that 
any conflict involving Turkey could conceivably bring in NATO and the United States.   
Although the situation in Nakhichevan subsided after Turkey’s warning to 
Armenia, the unease showed by Russia and Turkey demonstrated the new regional 
                                                 
100 Ibid, p.81 
45 
dynamics in Caucasia.  For the Turks, the attack on Nakhichevan was not just an attack 
on ethnic kinsmen but also a challenge to Ankara’s ability to project power into the 
region.  For the Russians, Turkey’s warning proved the potential of a wider regional war 
and challenged Moscow’s ability to hold influence in an area of major geostrategic 
importance to Russia.101 
In June 1992, presidential elections were held in Azerbaijan and were won by 
Abulfez Elchibey.  Elchibey had won on the platform that he would assert Azerbaijan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity by settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the 
benefit of Azerbaijan.  The military was quickly reorganized, and a relatively successful 
campaign by the Azeri army managed to capture some of the lost territory.  Elchibey 
internationalized the conflict, believing that participation from the United States, Britain, 
France, and the OSCE would benefit Azerbaijan in any peace negotiations.102   
In the spring of 1993, local Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh 
counterattacked with great success against the Azeri forces.  Armenian units captured 18 
villages and began a siege of Fizuli, an Azeri district capital 20 kilometers north of the 
Iranian border.  Under increasing domestic pressure to take action in Azerbaijan, Turkey 
reacted, this time, with a show of force.  The Turkish Third Army, based in eastern 
Anatolia, was put on alert and moved into positions along the Armenian border.  At the 
United Nations, Turkey’s envoy warned that “the Turkish government will take every 
measure, up to and including military measures, to repulse Armenian aggression.”103  
Anticipating a Turkish attack, Armenia reinforced its border with Turkey with elements 
of the Seventh Army, still controlled by Moscow and staffed partly with Russian soldiers. 
As tensions grew between Turkey, Armenia, and Russia, Iran viewed the fighting 
in the Fizuli district with alarm.  Fearing the possibility of a descent of thousands of 
Azeri refugees into its northern border, creating instability with Iran’s own Azeri 
populace, President Rafsanjani stated that “the fighting close to the Iranian border is now 
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affecting Iran’s security [and that] a more serious stance would have to be adopted should 
the situation continue.”104 
The situation continued to deteriorate until the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 822 on 30 April 1993.  The first Security Council resolution concerning the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Resolution 822 called for an immediate cease-fire and for 
the prompt withdrawal of all occupying forces from Azerbaijan.  Additionally, the 
resolution defended the inviolability of international borders while designating the OSCE 
as the international body through which Armenia and Azerbaijan were encouraged to 
negotiate. 
The cease-fire between the belligerent states was short lived, as Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians took advantage of a change of leadership in Azerbaijan to launch 
another offensive in June.  Heavy fighting soon reached the Iranian border, and 
approximately 200,000 refugees, cut off from escape into eastern Azerbaijan, began to 
move towards the northern border of Iran. 
Faced with this flood of war refugees, armed Iranian military units crossed the 
border into Azerbaijan in early September to create a 3-4 kilometer buffer zone.  Tehran 
hoped to provide safe haven for the refugees where humanitarian aid could be 
administered while also preventing the influx of Azeris into its northern region. 
Alarmed by the renewed Armenian offensive and the actions of the Iranian 
military in what could be interpreted as an invasion, Turkey again reinforced its border 
with Armenia with 50,000 troops.  However, diplomatic overtures again prevailed as 
Turkey exercised caution towards the Iranian movements and acquiesced to the Iranian 
incursion, choosing instead to view the military action as necessary to alleviate the 
problem on the border shared by Azerbaijan and Iran. 
Unlike Turkey, however, Russia showed disapproval to the Iranian military 
action.  In a statement from the Foreign Ministry, Russia issued a warning to Iran. 
In connection with the new development of the situation in the Armenia-
Azerbaijani conflict, we have made it clear that, whatever their motivation, we 
cannot show any understanding or support for the actions of the Iranian side.  The 
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fact that Iranian armed groups have crossed the border into Azerbaijan will not 
only lead to a further escalation of the conflict, but pushes it dangerously close to 
the verge of internationalization.105 
Despite the dangerous escalation of the conflict between the regional powers, 
caution and diplomatic initiatives prevailed.  However, tensions remained high, and a 
very real potential for a major regional war had narrowly been averted.106  The security 
concerns and the geopolitical interests of Turkey, Russia, and Iran had prompted the 
governments of each state to consider military action to protect its interests.  Although 
the militaries of the regional powers were not involved in any of the hostilities, the 
potential for future conflict still remained, as each state did not alter its interests and 
stance in Caucasia. 
A growing international awareness of the possible consequences of expanded 
warfare in Caucasia prompted the UN Security Council to pass resolution 874.  While 
calling for a cease-fire, Resolution 874 differed with other resolutions concerning the 
conflict in that it “urge[d] all states in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from 
any interference or intervention which would lead to the widening of the conflict and 
undermine peace and security in the region.”107  With this resolution, the United Nations 
hoped to encourage Turkey, Iran, and Russia to negotiate their differences in the region 
without resorting to violence and setting a precedent for future conflict in the former 
Soviet republics.     
A final offensive by Azeri forces in late 1993 and early 1994 did gain some 
territory back from the Armenians.  However, the Nagorno-Karabakh and seven Azeri 
districts still remained under Armenian control before an uneasy peace, which has held to 
this day, was achieved.  It was under this atmosphere that the US began to increase its 
presence within Caucasia. 
F. U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
With the Caspian Sea’s potential to become an important energy source, Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States have heightened their 
ucasia and Central Asia through investment and joint economic engagement in Ca
                                                 




ventures.  In September 1994, an $8 billion contract was signed between Western oil 
companies and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR).  Total 
projected profits from the contract, which will produce an estimated 650 million metric 
tons of crude oil over a 30-year period, are projected to be around $100 billion.  80 
percent of the profits would go to the Azerbaijani treasury, allowing Azerbaijan to 
strengthen its economy and its military to match the Armenian military arrayed against 
it.108    
The United States did not limit its penetration of Caucasia to only economic 
means.  NATO also sought to expand eastward as regional countries assumed an 
important role in the political and security calculations of Europe and the United States.  
Under the NATO Partnership for Peace program, joint training began between the 
militaries of NATO and the former Soviet republics.  With this joint military training 
through NATO and with its economic policy of pipeline politics through Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, the US sought to isolate Iran and mitigate Russian influence in the area.  
The United States increased its presence in Caucasia in 1996 in response to a 
Russian proposal for the limited division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors.  The 
United States directly opposed the Russian proposal, supporting the division of the sea 
into sectors with no joint sovereignty and supporting Azerbaijan’s need to limit Russia’s 
control of the Caspian Sea.  US direct engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was 
increased significantly in February 1997 when it joined France and Russia as co-
chairmen of the Minsk Group, the organization that had been formed from the member 
states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to find a 
solution to the ongoing conflict.  Before becoming a co-chair, the US had contended for a 
secondary role in the negotiations.  With its ascension, Washington became an active 
mediator throughout 1997 and 1998. 
Although the United States has not directly challenged Russia’s position in the 
region in regards to Nagorno-Karabakh, US investment in Azerbaijan has caused concern 
in Moscow.  In August 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin criticized the United States 
for declaring that Caucasia was within the US zone of interests.  Although US officials 
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responded by stating that Washington’s only interest was in promoting genuine 
independence for the states in the region, Russia continues to be very wary of the 
emerging US influence within the geopolitical environment of Caucasia.109  The United 
States, despite Russian discouragement continued to expand its interests and sphere of 
influence within Caucasia through direct action and through its NATO ally Turkey. 
G. U.S. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES 
In April 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell along with the President of 
Armenia, Robert Kocharyan, and the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar A. Aliyev, met in 
Key West, Florida to seek an end to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Although the details of the discussion remain confidential, both presidents were 
optimistic following the conclusion of the talks, expressing such sentiment to US 
President George W. Bush in a meeting at the White House.  Final settlement would 
allow the return of refugees from the war-torn region, the reopening of borders, and the 
resumption of trade and commerce.  President Aliyev, encouraged by the progress of the 
negotiations, expressed his support of the intensified US involvement in the peace talks.  
“We are hopeful that the United States of America and other co-chairs will intensify their 
efforts in order to achieve peaceful resolution to the conflict.”110   
For the United States, the reason for the direct involvement as a mediator in the 
conflict continued to be access to the oil in the Caspian region.  In an agreement with 
Azerbaijan in November 1999, the two countries along with Turkey agreed to build a 
pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.  The pipeline’s route 
would cross over Azerbaijan and Georgia, and avoid any territory controlled by Russia or 
Iran.  Stability in the region, brokered by the United States, would allow easier access to 
the region’s resources through pipelines like the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline while serving to 
enhance US influence and prestige and allowing the US “to expand the zone of 
democracy and free markets eastward.”111  This growing influence, however, would 
a and Iran.  Completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline by come at the expense of Russi
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2004 would take away transit revenues from Russian pipelines already operating in 
Azerbaijan while mitigating the effects of Russian influence in the area.  Future pipelines 
would continue to harm Russian influence in Azerbaijan.  US sanctions against Iran as 
well as the fact that the new pipeline would bypass any Iranian controlled territory would 
ensure that the US could continue the isolation of Iran from the region. 
Despite the continued unease of Russia on the growing role of the US in the 
conflict, the Russian, French, and American delegates, co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, 
seemed to find a common goal in trying to achieve peace in the volatile region.  
“American, Russian, and French diplomatic aims often collide.  But on the topic of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the three share an increasing desire to end the state of tension and 
blockade that knots up what once was, and could be again, one of history’s greatest 
crossroads.”112  “All the parties to the discussion agree that peace will bring considerable 
benefits to the region, to the peoples of both countries and to the entire South Caucasus 
region and beyond.”113   
For Russia, the immediate benefits to an end to the conflict include allowing 
Russia to engage in a higher volume of commerce with both countries without political 
restraints imposed by its alliance with Armenia, and the securing of a north-south trade 
route from Russia to Iran and the Persian Gulf.114  Despite continued US actions to 
isolate Russia through its pipeline politics, Russian long-term aims - stronger influence 
over the former Soviet republics, a goal it had sought since the initiation of peace 
negotiations in May 1994 - remained the same.  A peaceful resolution to the conflict 
would allow Russia to continue to pursue its geopolitical interests while maintaining the 
security of its southern border.   
Although Russia and the United States seemed to come to agreement over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and no misgivings of the April 2001 Key West talks were 
heard from Turkey, Iran continued to be secluded from the negotiations.  Peace in the 
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region, achieved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and sought through cooperation 
among the regional powers and the United States, may actually serve each state despite 
the perception of competing geopolitical interests and of the loss of influence. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has set a potentially dangerous precedent for how 
the regional powers in Central Asia and Caucasia will deal with future conflicts.  Despite 
the current cooperation between Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United 
States, there were occasions during the war between 1991 and 1994 when the possibility 
of a bigger regional war involving a NATO member and a former nuclear-armed 
superpower was high.   
Because of their geopolitical interests, their need for security, and the economic 
and political potential of Central Asia and Caucasia, Russian, Turkish, and Iranian goals 
in the two regions have clashed and will continue to clash.  The growth of US influence 
in the area has not mitigated the threat of future conflict but has rather raised the level of 
competition, as Russia tries to keep whatever residual influence it has on the region, and 
Iran tries to expand its power.   
Although there is optimism on continued cooperation between the regional 
powers as seen in the peace negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, there may be a future 
conflict in the developing states of Central Asia and Caucasia where the regional powers, 
along with their allies, are unable to resolve their differences through peaceful means and 
are drawn instead into a larger regional war.  With ethnic, cultural, religious, and 
linguistic ties; with competing geopolitical interests; and with complex regional 
dynamics, the possibility of such a war cannot be discounted. 
52 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After their independence in 1991 due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
governments of the Central Asian states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the Caucasian state of Azerbaijan faced serious 
political, economic, ethnic, and religious challenges as they sought to build institutions 
that would provide them the stability they needed to secure their new nations.  With 
ethnic, cultural, historic, linguistic and religious ties with the Middle East, the 
governments of these Central Asian states and Azerbaijan looked to the Middle East to 
aid in their development. 
The ethnic diversity of each of the states contributed to the problems the regimes 
faced, as each state tried to build a national identity separate from ethnicity. Many of the 
ethnic groups have ties to the Middle East and the majority share the religion of Islam 
with their Middle Eastern neighbors.  As Islamic influence grew through the 
encouragement of Middle Eastern states, the Central Asian governments increasingly 
became insecure against the mounting power of the Islamists, and responded with 
repressive measures while mitigating the influence of Middle Eastern powers in their 
states.  Encouraged by the West that feared the growth of a fundamentalist state in 
Central Asia, the governments excluded Islamic groups from political participation and 
continued their repressive measures against the perceived threat. 
The Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, however, still pursued foreign aid from 
their Middle Eastern neighbors.  In Turkey, they found a secular model that would not 
threaten to spread Islamic fundamentalism and would allow the states access to the West 
and the United States.  The United States, through Turkey, began expanding its influence 
into the region by using “pipeline politics” to project its economic power.   
With its foreign policy, the US hoped to mitigate Iranian influence and the growth 
of Islamic fundamentalism into the region while moderating the influence of Russia, the 
former hegemonic power in the region.  Iranian influence into the region was largely 
contained by US foreign policy, though the possibility does exist for future 
rapprochement.  In regards to Russia, the US has managed to engage Russia to build 
53 
security within the region.  However, because of competing national interests, friction 
between the emerging regional powers and the United States may not be limited to the 
political and economic field.   
As exemplified by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the ethnic diversity and 
ties each Central Asian state and Azerbaijan have with foreign powers could cause the 
escalation of a local dispute into a regional war.  The geopolitical interests and security of 
the Middle Eastern powers of Turkey and Iran are intimately tied to events in Central 
Asia and Caucasia.  Russia, always wary of events in its southern flank, will continue to 
be engaged in the region to secure its borders and advance its national interests.  The 
growth of US influence in the area has not mitigated the threat of future conflict but has 
raised the level of competition. 
Because of their shared ethnic, cultural, historical, linguistic and religious ties, the 
Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will continue to rely on the Middle East for their 
development.  Turkey and Iran, historic Middle East powers within the region have 
expanded their influence.  The US, through its ally, Turkey, has also gained influence at 
the expense of the former regional power, Russia.  However, this complex, evolving 
relationship could lead to future conflict.  Any country that has an interest in Central Asia 
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